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Source Disclosure in Public Figure Defamation
Actions: Towards Greater First
Amendment Protection
The news media's use of confidential sources to uncover informa-
tion during the Watergate scandal demonstrated the importance of un-
identified informants to the reporting process.' Although most
confidential reporter-source relationships occur in less dramatic set-
tings, the existence of such relationships often provides the best means
of obtaining reliable information. A secret informant, frequently one
of the most valuable sources of information for an investigative jour-
nalist, may require anonymity before revealing information to a jour-
nalist because revelation of the informant's identity may lead to
adverse consequences to the source, including harassment and possible
loss of employment. The value and vulnerability of covert informants
underscores the importance of providing judicial protection of their
identities against unwarranted disclosure.
Attempts to force disclosure of confidential news sources during
criminal proceedings have been widely publicized.2 The Supreme
Court has ruled that a reporter does not have an absolute testimonial
privilege to refuse to disclose confidential sources when disclosure
1. For a discussion of the use of informants during the Washington Post's investiga-
tion of the Watergate scandal, see T. CROUSE, THE BOYS ON THE Bus 290-97 (1973); D.
HALBERSTAM, THE PowERs THAT BE 648-50 (1979); B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL
THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
2. In 1978, New York Times reporter Myron Farber was subpoenaed by the defense to
produce documents in the murder trial of a medical doctor. Although the New Jersey shield
law provided protection for a reporter's sources of information, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ordered disclosure, holding that the criminal defendant's right to compulsory process
under the sixth amendment prevailed over the New Jersey shield law. See In re Farber, 78
N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). In Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972), reporter William
Farr, covering the murder trial of Charles Manson, obtained copies of a statement by a
prospective witness. Attempting to limit trial publicity, the court issued an order prohibiting
attorneys or witnesses from disclosing to the press the contents of any evidence. The court
ordered Farr to disclose the source of his information, rejecting Farr's contentions that Cali-
fornia's shield law and the first amendment protected him from forced disclosure of his
source.
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would be relevant to a grand jury investigation. 3 A different conflict
has arisen in civil trials, however, particularly in defamation actions in
which a journalist might refuse to name the source of an allegedly false
and defamatory statement. This conflict may pose a serious problem in
public figure defamation suits because to prevail under New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 a public official or, as expanded in a subsequent
case, a public figure,5 must prove that a media defendant published the
defamatory statement with knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement.6 Defined as "actual
malice," this scienter requirement is designed to prevent the threat of
excessive libel judgments from inhibiting free discussion of public is-
sues by the press.
7
The conflict between a plaintiff's need for evidence to prove actual
malice and a journalist's commitment to withhold the identity of a con-
fidential source has emerged partly as a consequence of the landmark
New York Times decision. The heavy evidentiary burden of the New
York Times actual malice requirement has increased the need for a
public figure plaintiff to obtain all sources of evidence. When a re-
porter claims that he or she acted without recklessness because a confi-
dential source was reliable, the reliability of that source is an issue at
trial. The plaintiff will normally attempt to force disclosure of the
source's identity, because "recklessness may be found where there are
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy
of his reports."' 8 Compelled disclosure of an informant's identity, how-
ever, threatens to inhibit the willingness of a source to pass information
to reporters, a restriction on the press that clashes with the Supreme
Court's commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues.9
3. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The term "public figure" will
be used throughout this Comment to refer to both public officials and figures. See notes 13-
14 & accompanying text infra.
6. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The scope of this Comment is limited to source disclosure cases
in public figure defamation actions. Private individual plaintiffs are not required to prove
that a media defendant published with knowing or reckless falsity to prove liability in a
defamation action. Rather, a state may define for itself the appropriate standard of liability
for an action brought against a media defendant by a private individual, so long as a state
does not impose liability without fault. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Hence, it is less likely that the identity of a source will be necessary to a private individual's
cause of action for defamation against a media defendant.
7. 376 U.S. at 277-79.
8. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
9. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). A related problem
respecting disclosure is that a public figure plaintiff may file a defamation suit solely to
discover a source's identity to seek revenge against the source. See 23 C. WRiGrr & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 792 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
GRAHAM]; Kovner, Disturbing Trends in the Law of Defamation: A Publishing Attorney's
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Recent federal and state court decisions have left unclear what
standards, if any, courts should use when striking the balance between
a defamation plaintiffs need for evidence to prove the New York Times
standard and the interests in protecting the identities of confidential
sources of information. This Comment focuses on attempts to compel
disclosure of confidential sources in public figure defamation actions.
Following an analysis of the relevant constitutional interests, news-
gathering, freedom of expression, and free speech rights of the source,
the Comment traces the judicial evolution of a journalist's testimonial
privilege in defamation cases. In recognition of the chilling effect of
compelled disclosure on the exercise of first amendment freedoms, the
Comment concludes by recommending that the standards be modified
to afford greater first amendment protection to confidential news
sources whose identities are sought in public figure defamation suits.
First, a plaintiff should be required to provide substantial evidence of
actual injury or harm before disclosure is compelled; and second, a
plaintiff should be required to show substantial evidence of success on
the merits for those issues capable of proof without disclosure of confi-
dential sources.
New York Times Co. v. SUllivan
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,10 the Commissioner of Public
Affairs for Montgomery, Alabama brought a libel action against the
New York Times for publishing a paid advertisement criticizing the
conduct of the Montgomery police during a demonstration. The trial
court entered a $500,000 judgment against the Times and several co-
defendants, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. A unanimous
Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the first amend-
ment affords the press limited protection to publish an otherwise de-
famatory statement about a public official if the statement was
published without "actual malice," that is, without "knowledge that it
was false" or without "reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."" Although the Court found that the advertisement's libelous
statement might have been negligently published,' 2 the Court denied
Opinion, 3 HASTrNGs CONST. L.Q. 363, 370 (1976): "In recent years, however, some pub-
lishers have been confronted with the defamation suit designed to force disclosure of confi-
dential sources. Such a suit is often brought by a public official or other person who feels
damaged by leaks, or 'not-for-attribution' statements made by persons with knowledge of
the facts. Their objective is often neither damages nor vindication, for the underlying mate-
rial may well be substantially true, but rather disclosure and punishment of the confidential
source who may have performed a substantial public service at risk to his employment or
career."
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. Id. at 279-80.
12. Id. at 288.
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recovery because the evidence failed to establish that the statements
were published with actual malice.
The New York Times decision affirmed the Court's recognition of
the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open," 13 and ar-
ticulated the actual malice standard to protect the press from liability
for good faith reporting of public affairs. 14 Underlying the Court's de-
cision to impose this first amendment limitation on libel laws was the
recognition that strict liability for false and defamatory statements con-
cerning public figures could lead to self-censorship of truthful informa-
tion by a press fearing the risk of large damages awards.
15
Hence, under New York Times, to succeed in a defamation action,
a public official or public figure must prove that a media defendant
published an otherwise defamatory statement about the plaintiff with a
knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of the statement.
Constitutional Interests
Newsgathering
The constitutional interests establishing a foundation for a re-
porter's privilege to withhold the identities of confidential sources dur-
ing civil discovery are rooted in the first amendment, which guards
13. Id. at 270.
14. The New York Times rule subsequently was extended to include "public figures."
See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The definition of public figure,
however, has been a subject of continuing confusion that the Supreme Court has attempted
to clarify in several cases. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971). At one time, the Court reasoned that a private individual should be subject to the
same burden of proof as a public figure whenever he or she is involved in a matter of general
public concern. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Court later re-
jected this construction, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-48, 352 (1974), and
now seems to require that the private individual voluntarily attract public attention on pub-
lic issues before he or she can be defined as a public figure. Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166-69 (1979). For a discussion of the public figure definition in defa-
mation actions, see Note, Libel-Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.: The Defnition
of Public Figure is Narrowed, 58 N.C.L. REv. 1042 (1980); Note, Public Figures and Malice:
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Restricting the Constitutional Privilege, 14 U. RICH. L. RE.
737 (1980); Comment, The Evolution o/the Public Figure Doctrine in Defamation Actions, 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 1009 (1980).
15. 376 U.S. at 277-79. "The general proposition that freedom of expression upon pub-
lic questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The
Constitutional safeguard, we have said, 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."' Id. at
269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
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against laws "abridging freedom of speech, or of the press."'1 6 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the first amendment's commitment to a
free press as a constitutional safeguard for the widest dissemination of
information about public issues to an enlightened citizenry, 17 and has
struck down a wide variety of laws that have restricted freedom of the
press, including prior restraints on publication, '8 regulation of editorial
judgment, 19 taxes based on circulation,20 and strict liability for defama-
tory publications. 2' "[Slince informed public opinion is the most po-
tent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be re-
garded otherwise than with grave concern.
22
The Court, however, has not explicitly recognized a first amend-
ment right to gather news, a journalistic function in which the receipt
of information from confidential sources plays an important part.23 Al-
though the Court has not specifically recognized this right, it has occa-
sionally given the right implicit support. In Branzburg v. Hayes,24 the
Supreme Court ordered three reporters to reveal the identities of their
confidential sources before a grand jury. The Court concluded that the
state's interest in investigating criminal activity was a sufficiently com-
pelling reason to deny the reporters' first amendment claim for a privi-
lege to protect those sources.25 Although the Court ordered disclosure
of the sources, its plurality opinion evidenced implicit support for a
constitutional right to gather news. Justice White, writing for the
Court, admonished that the result was not a suggestion "that news
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." 26
16. U.S. CONST. amend. .
17. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
18. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ey-
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
19. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
20. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1936).
21. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
23. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 521, 602: "In effect, the Court has failed to accord the newsgathering interest
the full measure of favorable procedures, presumptions, and substantive doctrines that nor-
mally follow from the determination that a particular interest is truly of First Amendment
pedigree. Yet the majority opinions have failed to explain or defend the decision not to give
the newsgathering interest full First Amendment status; instead, they have glossed over the
problem with empty rhetorical testimonials to the importance of the interest."
24. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
25. Id. at 690.
26. Id. at 681. Eight years later, the Court reiterated its Branzburg support for news-
gathering in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that news
reporters have a constitutional right to attend criminal trials). "It is not crucial whether we
January 1982] MEDIA SOURCE DISCLOSURE
Despite the uncertain level of constitutional protection afforded
the newsgathering interest, several lower courts have placed news-
gathering on firm constitutional footing by interpreting the language in
Branzburg as a clear constitutional protection for newsgathering. 7 Al-
though the Supreme Court has only afforded newsgathering "some
protection, '28 these lower courts have assumed that Branzburg explic-
itly grants newsgathering first amendment protection, providing report-
ers with a constitutional shield against disclosure orders that could
compromise the newsgathering interest.
29
Freedom of Expression
Even in the absence of explicit Supreme Court recognition of a
constitutional right to gather news under the first amendment, com-
pelled disclosure of confidential sources may be unconstitutional on
other grounds. If the practical effect of forced disclosure is to impair
the flow of information to the public, it may abridge the first amend-
ment's basic purpose of protecting freedom of expression and commu-
nication. As the Court has noted:
The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, prohibits
governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." These expressly guaran-
teed freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government.
30
describe this right to attend criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations con-
cerning them as a 'right of access,' or a 'right to gather information,' for we have recognized
that 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated.'" 448 U.S. at 576.
27. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633-F.2d 583 (1st Cir.
1980) (civil discovery requests for confidential sources to be judged according to a standard
balancing reporter's privilege against litigant's asserted need for requested information);
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (adopting a balancing approach with
respect to criminal discovery requests);' Mize v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 475 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (civil discovery requests for confidential sources receive balancing test analysis).
28. 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
29. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979): "Where a witness claims
a privilege founded on the First Amendment of the Constitution, our 'reason and experi-
ence' directs us in the first instance to that Amendment. In Branzburg v. Hayes the Court
acknowledged the existence of First Amendment protection for 'newsgathering.' The inter-
relationship between newsgathering, news dissemination and the need for a journalist to
protect his or her source is too apparent to require belaboring."
30. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 557 (1980). Professor
Thomas Emerson has suggested that the first amendment provides the basis for a system of
free expression, concluding that "[t]he fundamental meaning of the First Amendment, then,
is to guarantee an effective system of freedom of expression suitable for the present times."
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 14-15 (1970). The Court recently
reaffirmed the first amendment's commitment to the free flow of information, noting that
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
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A government action may be struck down on first amendment
grounds even though it is not designed to restrict free speech. The
Court has noted that "laws which actually affect the exercise of these
vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for
the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative com-
petence." 31 Thus, in NAACP v. Button,32 the Court invalidated a Vir-
ginia statute that prohibited the NAACP from retaining its own legal
staff to represent litigants in racial discrimination actions when the
NAACP was not a party.33 The Court held that the statute indirectly
inhibited the NAACP's freedom to express itself through litigation.34
Although it acknowledged the state's legitimate interest in regulating
the solicitation of legal business, the Court found that the Virginia stat-
ute indirectly hindered freedom of speech by decreasing the likelihood
that a potential litigant would be advised to seek legal redress for acts
of racial discrimination when legal redress offered the only effective
method by which a member of an oppressed minority group could fight
racial discrimination. 35
Similarly, compelled disclosure of confidential sources might be
held an unconstitutional inhibition on freedom of expression. Confi-
"the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of indi-
viduals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members
of the public may draw." First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see
also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (law requiring addressee to notify
post office as a condition to receipt of "communist political propaganda" held to be an
unconstitutional restriction on the flow of information by violating the right to free speech).
31. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); see also Note,
Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationshio, 80
YALE L.J. 317, 337-38 (1970).
32. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
33. Id. at 420-23.
34. Id. at 434-37.
35. See id. at 435-36. The Button case discussed freedom of expression generally, and
its language implies a broad applicability in the first amendment area. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, drew from a wide range of first amendment cases, including Near v.
Minnesota ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which struck down prior restraints on publi-
cation. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
The Supreme Court's interchangeable use of prior speech and press cases to support
decisions involving free expression reflects the expansive range of first amendment protec-
tion. See generally Note, The Right ofthe Press to Gather Information, 71 COLuM. L. REy.
838 (1971). For a discussion of the historical grounds for the interchangeable authority of
speech and press cases, see Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77
(1975); see also Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflict-
ingApproaches, 75 MicH. L. REv. 43, 58 (1976): "It is still asserted, however, that, notwith-
standing the historical context, the Constitution does use two terms and therefore the Court
has a textual basis for distinguishing between the two freedoms. This contention has, I be-
lieve, been thoroughly and convincingly refuted by others. . . . Whatever theoretical merit
the position may have, it will almost certainly flounder in practice when it comes time to
decide what is covered by the term 'the press.' If the New York Times is covered, what about
Screw, another New York publication? Consider too the person who wants to write a book.
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dential sources constitute an important reservoir of information and
are instrumental to the process of complete, interpretive news report-
ing.3 6 The possibility that media defendants will be routinely forced to
reveal the identities of confidential sources in the course of defamation
litigation may discourage them from using confidential information,
and may inhibit informants from divulging information. These inhibi-
tions may obstruct effective news reporting, rendering compelled dis-
closure an unconstitutional restriction of free communication and
expression. Because a news source may insist on confidentiality as a
condition to providing information to reporters, a judicial or statutory
policy that threatens to impair the flow of information from confiden-
tial sources by threatening confidentiality should be subject to careful
scrutiny under the protective umbrella of the first amendment.3
7
Free Speech Rights of the Source
In addition to the potential inhibiting effect of compelled disclo-
sure on a free press, disclosure can also affect the constitutional rights
of the informant. As some confidential sources may be unwilling to
speak to reporters because they fear that their identities may be re-
vealed, compelled disclosure may create a climate that inhibits the free
speech rights of the source.
3 8
The Supreme Court has recognized that confidentiality is some-
times necessary for the uninhibited exercise of first amendment rights.
Will it matter whether this individual is considered a 'scholar'? The practical difficulties
seem insurmountable." (footnotes omitted).
The Court has noted that first amendment rights are inseparable. Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (striking down requirement that labor organizer register with state
officials before soliciting support for labor movement): "It was not by accident or coinci-
dence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with
the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All
these, though not identical, are inseparable."
36. See note 47 & accompanying text infra. As Justice Stewart observed in his dissent-
ing opinion in Branzburg, confidential sources are necessary to the process of complete news
reporting, for if the press "is to perform its constitutional mission, [it] must do far more than
merely print public statements or publish prepared handouts." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 729 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Professor Vincent Blasi notes that print journalists have placed greater emphasis on
interpretative reporting, requiring more information from confidential sources. He suggests
that this greater need is largely the result of the predominant role of the broadcast media in
reporting breaking news. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 229, 234 (1971).
37. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
38. See notes 49-57 & accompanying text infra. See also Note, The Rights of Sources-
he Critical Element in the Clash over Reporter's Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202 (1979); Com-
ment, The Newsman's Privilege.- Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private
Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198, 1228-35 (1970).
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In NAACP v. Alabama,39 the Court gave support to the right of confi-
dential association by blocking the Alabama Attorney General's at-
tempt to force disclosure of the names of all NAACP members in the
state. The Court found that disclosure of the Alabama membership
could have the practical effect of inhibiting the right of NAACP mem-
bers to associate. "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in
many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of as-
sociation, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.
'40
Two years after NAACP v. Alabama, the Court gave support to a right
of anonymous speech by holding unconstitutional a local handbill ordi-
nance requiring the identity of the sponsor to be printed on the hand-
bill.4' Justice Black's majority opinion noted that "identification and
fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public
matters of importance." 42
Similarly, in their relationships with reporters, sources may de-
mand privacy before revealing sensitive information. The "fear of re-
prisal" is a problem for informants who are vulnerable to political or
economic attempts to force their silence.43 For sources, confidentiality
is a valuable prerequisite to the communication of sensitive ideas and
information to the public, and their freedom of speech may depend on
the ability to speak without public identification. In many instances,
confidential sources may attempt to pass information to reporters that
is critical of public figures. Inhibitions on such criticism may restrict
public debate on important issues, limiting precisely the type of speech
the first amendment was designed to protect.44
The Chili
Underlying the constitutional arguments supporting the protection
of confidential news sources is the argument that compelled disclosure
actually inhibits the flow of information from confidential informants
and the press. Without a chilling effect, or a threat of a chilling effect,
the first amendment claims of the press and its sources of information
are less likely to be persuasive to a court in a disclosure case.45
39. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
40. Id. at 462.
41. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
42. Id. at 64-65; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down state
law requiring teachers to disclose all organizational affiliations).
43. See notes 47-54 & accompanying text infra.
44. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reluctance to address the question of
whether a source has such first amendment rights in a grand jury context, see Murasky, The
Journalist's Privilege. Branzburg and its 4ftermath, 52 TEx. L. REv. 829, 847-49 (1974).
Murasky suggests that the Court was reluctant to address the rights of the source because it
was disinclined to allow criminals to publicize their conduct through the press.
45. The Supreme Court rejected subjective assertions of chilling effects as a foundation
MEDIA SOURCE DISCLOSUREJanuary 1982]
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In United States v. Caldwell,46 a case involving a reporter's refusal
to comply with a subpoena ordering him to bring notes and tape re-
cordings of his interviews with officials of the Black Panther organiza-
tion, several prominent journalists who supported the certiorari
petition filed affidavits concerning the essential role of confidential
sources in the newsgathering process. One of these journalists empha-
sized the interpretive value of information received in confidence, not-
ing that "to understand the facts, reporters must constantly appraise the
accuracy and meaning of words and the significance of deeds. In that
effort, reporters require a background of confidential judgments and
observations obtainable only in privacy and in trust.
' '47
It is questionable whether the absence of testimonial rights for
news reporters chills the flow of information to the public.48 The po-
tential chilling effect of forced disclosure, however, is a difficult phe-
nomenon to document and does not readily lend itself to quantitative
for a first amendment challenge in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (rejecting justiciability
of first amendment claim absent a showing of actual or threatened harm to first amendment
interests). "Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of
specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Id. at 13-14.
46. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971). Caldwell was one
of three cases consolidated under the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
47. Affidavit of Dan Rather, reprinted in Freedom of the Press.- Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess. 1208 (1971-72). CBS correspondent Mike Wallace included in his affidavit an
example of a story dependent on information received confidentially from government em-
ployees. "Without that information," Wallace stated, "we could not have constructed the
story of how a torpedo project originally scheduled to cost $680,000,000 had risen to a pro-
jected $4,000,000,000." Affidavit of Mike Wallace, Id. at 1207. The affidavit of Walter
Cronkite provided several examples of information received in confidence. "The material
that I obtain in privacy and on a confidential basis is given to me on that basis because my
news sources have learned to trust me and can confide in me without fear of exposure. In
nearly every case, their position, perhaps their very job or career, would be in jeopardy if
this were not the case. There are almost daily examples of this. For example: A member of
the staff of a United States Senator advised me, far in advance of the announcement, that his
employer did not plan to run for reelection. Another person in a similar position tipped me
to his employer's intention to seek a higher office. An officer high in Pentagon circles re-
cently offered evidence of pressure high in the military command structure to get the Presi-
dent to cut back on his Viet Nam withdrawal commitments. A bartender told me of fraud in
restaurant inspection in New York City. A scientist asserted that the Atomic Energy Com-
mission's safety standards for atomic energy installations were not adequate. None of these
persons would have volunteered this information if they thought they would be exposed as
the source of the information. In short, I would be unable to obtain much of the material
that is indispensable to my work if it were believed that people could not talk to me confi-
dentially." Affidavit of Walter Cronkite, id. at 1205.
48. The Supreme Court expressed this doubt in declining to recognize certain testimo-
nial rights for news reporters. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (denial of a privi-
lege to refuse discovery into the editorial thought process of journalists); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (denial of a privilege to withhold the identities of sources before
grand juries).
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searches for tangible, statistical proof. Several obstacles render any ac-
curate measurement of a chilling effect difficult.
First, the expressed willingness of reporters to suffer the legal con-
sequences of a refusal to disclose the identities of sources may be the
incentive that encourages sources to speak.49 Jailing reporters who
honor their commitments of confidentiality, however, imposes a high
price on the exercise of first amendment rights.50 Moreover, the risk
that a reporter may go to jail to protect a confidential source may deter
a source from coming forward for fear that his or her protection may
come at the expense of the journalist.51
In addition, reporters are not likely to admit that they have can-
celled a story because of fear that its publication might lead to litiga-
tion, because such an admission confesses that professional standards
were compromised by factors apart from complete and accurate news
reporting.52 A strong journalistic ethic encourages the publication of
important stories, even if publication entails legal or financial risks to
the news organization. As this commitment is an important profes-
sional standard, a reporter or an editor is not likely to admit that a
story was not produced for fear of compelled disclosure.
Moreover, the insidious nature of the chilling effect poses the
greatest obstacle to its documentation. A journalist cannot know when
a potential source is withholding ifitformation for fear of identification,
because sources choosing to remain silent do not come forward and
thus are not easily identified.
53
49. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 276-77
(1971); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18, 47 (1969-70).
50. Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18, 47 (1969-70).
51. Id. at 46.
52. Professor Ben Bagdikian, journalism professor and a former national editor at the
Washington Post, notes: "There is a strong ethic in journalism that militates against failure
to produce a story of social importance. The ideal is that a journalist and a journalistic
organization will produce a socially significant story at any cost. Fear and expense should
not play a part in giving the public important information. That is the ideal. Obviously, it is
not universally observed. But it is a strong convention that few journalists or editors like to
violate or if they have, to admit it publicly. Consequently, if a reporter or editor is asked if
there are important stories that were not produced for fear of enforced disclosure, there will
not always be a candid answer." Letter from Professor Ben Bagdikian (July 28, 1981) (copy
on file with the Hastings Law Journal); see also Anderson, Libel and Press Censorsho, 53
TEx. L. REv. 422, 434 (1974-75).
53. "Sources who decide privately not to take initiatives in contact with journalists and
do so because they fear the journalist will be forced to disclose the source, are unknown and
therefore cannot be interviewed or surveyed. If the source is explicit with a journalist in
deciding against disclosure for fear of forced disclosure, the source is not likely to be known
or reached for measurement of chilling effect. And if reached, some sources would be reluc-
tant to respond with candor for the same reason the same source decided not to provide
information to the journalist, fear of being identified. . . .The journalist who fails to ob-
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Despite the inherent difficulty of quantifying the chilling effect, an
examination into the dynamics of newsgathering and news dissemina-
tion reveals several ways in which the threat of disclosure can inhibit
the free flow of news. First, the potential risk of disclosure and the
attendant costs of fighting a legal battle to prevent disclosure may inject
considerations of self-censorship into the newsroom decisionmaking
process. An editorial decision to publish or hold a story involves many
factors. When a story is based largely on information from a confiden-
tial source, the possibility that disclosure will be ordered becomes an-
other consideration in an editor's decision whether to publish the story
or to withhold it from the public.54 The threat of litigation to protect a
confidential source can be particularly damaging to a publication that
lacks the financial resources to sustain the legal costs of protecting a
source, and can therefore create an economic disincentive from using
sensitive confidential information.
55
tain crucial information from a source, may not produce a story. The lack of a story is not
identifiable to the outsider, so it is difficult to interview or survey the reporter who did not do
a story." Letter from Professor Ben Bagdikian (July 28, 1981) (copy on file with the Hastings
Law Journal).
54. "Within the journalistic process there is sometimes an early recognition that the
story will require an information transaction that will have to be confidential. A govern-
ment employee may offer a view of classified or administratively confidential documents.
Or a corporate official may offer incriminating evidence against a superior or the corpora-
tion; or a prosecutor may offer to make known, privately, some grand jury proceedings. Or
an investigation of organized crime will hinge on protracted secret dealings with unsavory
characters. Factors for and against proceeding are often argued in shifting and uncertain
balances. One factor is calculation of the probability of forced disclosure or some other
compromise of the promise of confidentiality." Id.
55. In Washington Post Company v. Keogh, Judge Skelley Wright noted: "The threat
of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as
chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit
itself, especially to advocates of unpopular causes. All persons who desire to exercise their
right to criticize public officials are not as well equipped financially as the Post to defend
against a trial on the merits. Unless persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their
First Amendment rights are assured freedom from the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend
to become self-censors." 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011
(1967). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971): "The very possi-
bility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is threat enough
to cause discussion and debate to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone,' thereby keeping
protracted discussion from public cognizance."
Professor Anderson notes that the costs of litigation create "a system in which the rele-
vant question is not whether a story is libelous, but whether the subject is likely to sue, and if
so, how much it will cost to defend." Anderson, Libel and Press Se/f-Censorship, 53 TEX. L.
REv. 422, 424-25 (1975).
For an account of the interplay between lawyers and journalists in a non-libel setting,
see D. HALBERSTAM, THE POWERS.THAT BE 572-78 (1979). Halberstam recreates the details
of the debate between lawyers and journalists over the decision to publish the Pentagon
Papers, a case that was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. See New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Second, the risk of disclosure deters informants, particularly those
holding positions in which criticism may not be tolerated. Professor
Vincent Blasi, who conducted a survey attempting to quantify the in-
hibiting effect of forced disclosure, concluded that the disclosure risk
does not cause "sources to 'dry up' completely," although it does have
the effect of "'poisoning the atmosphere' so as to make insightful, in-
terpretive reporting more difficult."
'56
Empirical evidence that coipelled disclosure of news sources in-
hibits the free exercise of first amendment rights is not always a neces-
sary element of a case challenging the constitutionality of disclosure
orders,57 but the Supreme Court has rejected several first amendment
challenges in the absence of empirical proof of a chilling effect. In
Buckley v. Valeo,58 the Supreme Court upheld campaign contribution
disclosure requirements, emphasizing that the lack of empirical evi-
dence that such requirements would inhibit the association rights of
minor political parties left the first amendment interest too speculative
to outweigh the public interest in reducing government corruption
through disclosure.59 In Branzburg v. Hayes,60 the Court found that the
potential chilling effect of confidential source disclosure was "to a great
extent speculative, ' 61 and concluded that the speculative harm to first
amendment interests was insufficient to overcome the public interest in
disclosure before grand juries investigating criminal activity.
62
The Court, however, has not consistently required empirical evi-
dence of chilling effects in first amendment cases.63 Consequently, the
56. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. Rav. 229, 284
(1971). Professor Blasi based his findings on interviews, questionnaires, and a quantitative
survey.
57. See note 64 & accompanying text infra.
58. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 71-72.
60. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
61. Id. at 693-94.
62. Id. at 695.
63. The Court has struck down state laws that posed only theoretical threats to the free
exercise of first amendment rights. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (state
law banning anonymous handbills infringes free speech); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959) (elimination of scienter requirement in obscenity cases inhibits free speech); Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (law denying tax exemptions to persons refusing to sign
loyalty declaration constitutes deprivation of first amendment liberties without due process);
see also Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and its Aftermath, 52 Tax. L. Rv.
829, 853-56 (1974-75). Justice Stewart, dissenting inBranzburg, criticized the plurality's em-
phasis on empirical data, noting that the Court had "never before demanded that First
Amendment rights rest on elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any conceiva-
ble doubt that deterrent effects exist. . . ." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 733 (1972).
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court concluded that a fear of
damages awards in libel actions can deter the press from disseminating truthful information
to the public about issues of public importance. Id. at 277. This conclusion, which was
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Court has not articulated a clear rule for the requirement of empirical
proof of chilling effects in cases challenging state conduct on first
amendment grounds. Because of the Court's traditional view that first
amendment freedoms are delicate and need "breathing space" to sur-
vive,64 however, a speculative harm to a first amendment interest may
provide a sufficient basis for resolving evidentiary doubts in favor of
protecting the first amendment interest.
The Privilege
A journalist's testimonial privilege to withhold the identity of a
confidential source from compelled disclosure has been rejected by the
Supreme Court in the context of grand jury investigations.65 Although
the Court has not yet addressed the question of privilege in the context
of public figure defamation actions, this privilege has received mixed
acceptance in lower courts. 66 In resolving the issues surrounding this
privilege, a court must weigh the constitutional interests protecting the
confidentiality of the source against the public figure plaintiffs need for
evidence to prove with "convincing clarity"67 that a false, defamatory
statement was published with knowing or reckless falsity. 68
Opponents of a reporter's privilege in defamation suits argue that
a testimonial privilege protecting the source of a defamatory statement
would allow a journalist to escape liability by hiding behind an as-
serted belief in the reliability of a confidential source.69 As "reckless
disregard" requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant publisher
"in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication," 70
a defamation plaintiff could find it difficult, if not impossible, to over-
come a media defendant's claim that there was no "subjective aware-
ness of probable falsity. ' 71 Furthermore, a privilege foreclosing
disclosure of defamatory sources could encourage unjustified attacks
against public figures through the media by allowing a source to pass
deliberate falsehoods to the press while avoiding any personal liability
for their content.
72
Courts deciding whether to order disclosure of a source in defama-
tion actions are provided with little judicial guidance. The absence of a
unsupported by statistical documentation, formed the basis for the Court's adoption of the
"actual malice" standard.
64. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
65. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
66. See notes 102-03 & accompanying text infra.
67. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
68. Id. at 280; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (1977).
69. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 791-92.
70. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
71. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974).
72. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 791.
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federal law to protect reporter-source relationships73 and the lack of
Supreme Court guidance in this area have forced the courts to rely
upon uncertain prior case law.74 The results have been inconsistent
interpretations of the case law and inconsistent interpretations of appli-
cable standards whenever a court balances the interests of the parties in
reaching a result.
75
Branzburg v. Hayes and Herbert v. Lando
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of source
disclosure in public figure defamation actions, it addressed the problem
in related contexts in Branzburg v. Hayes76 and Herbert v. Lando.
77
In Branzburg, a divided Supreme Court rejected an absolute privi-
lege to refuse disclosure of confidential sources during grand jury in-
vestigations. Although several courts have held Branzburg to be
dispositive of privilege claims in defamation cases, 7 8 most courts reject
its application in civil cases because its scope was limited to the issue of
a reporter's obligation to testify during grand jury investigations. 79 In
addition, there may be an interest in compelling testimony in criminal
73. Although a federal shield law, which would protect a journalist's right to withhold
the identities of confidential sources, has not been adopted, it has been proposed several
times. See Note, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case For a Federal Shield
Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 160 (1976).
Twenty-six states have enacted shield laws, varying in the range of protection they offer
to journalists and their sources. Several state shield laws exempt defamation actions from
their coverage or severely restrict the applicability of their use in defamation cases. See
Note, Shield Statutes: A Changing Problem in Light of Branzburg, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1381,
1386-92 (1979). For a discussion of the limitations of shield laws and the various discrepan-
cies among them, see Note, State Newsman s Privilege Statutes. A CriticalAnalysis, 49 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 150 (1973). For a reproduction of current state shield laws, see R. SACK,
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 621-48 (1980).
California amended its constitution in 1980 to protect journalists from contempt cita-
tions for refusing to disclose sources. The amendment protects print and broadcast journal-
ists from being "adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or
any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose the source of
any information procured while so connected or employed. .. , or for refusing to disclose
any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of
information for communication to the public." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
74. See notes 79-109 & accompanying text infra.
75. Id.
76. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
77. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
78. These courts consider Branzburg to be dispositive in libel actions or other civil
actions as a general rejection of privileges for news reporters to withhold testimony from the
courts. See Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 930 (1977); Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (1980).
79. 408 U.S. at 682. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979);
Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1972); Gilbert
v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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proceedings stemming from the constitutional right of a criminal de-
fendant to examine the evidence against him or her.80 No comparable
interest is implicated in a civil proceeding in which a plaintiff seeks
only to recover damages.
81
In 1979, the Supreme Court rendered its first opinion concerning
discovery in defamation cases in Herbert v. Lando,82 holding that jour-
nalists in a defamation action did not have an absolute privilege to
block discovery into the editorial process that resulted in an allegedly
defamatory report concerning a public figure. In Herbert, a retired
army officer, Colonel Anthony Herbert, brought a defamation action
against the Columbia Broadcasting System for suggesting that he had
lied in a television report about his claims that superior officers had
covered up war crimes. During discovery, Herbert deposed the produ-
cer of the report, Barry Lando, and inquired about his state of mind
during the editorial process in an attempt to discover evidence of reck-
lessness to satisfy the New York Times standard. Lando refused to an-
swer questions about his state of mind, claiming a first amendment
privilege to withhold such information to promote uninhibited editorial
discussion in the newsroom. Although the Second Circuit upheld the
privilege as absolute,83 the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
any editorial privilege, absolute or qualified, would impose too great a
burden on a plaintiff's ability to prove actual malice under the New
York Times rule.84 As the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had
a "subjective awareness of probable falsity,"85 the Court concluded that
an editorial privilege, barring discovery into the journalist's editorial
thought process, would foreclose the plaintiff's ability to prove his
case.8
6
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
81. Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18, 25 (1969). Moreover, the five to four division of the Court in
Branzburg weakens the strength of its holding rejecting the reporter's privilege. Justice
Powell's concurring opinion was enigmatic, embracing a balancing test that weighed free-
dom of the press against the general obligation of citizens to testify with respect to criminal
conduct. 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). At least one federal court has interpreted
Branzburg to constitute a qualified first amendment privilege by combining Justice Powell's
concurrence with the Branzburg dissenters "to provide a majority of five justices that would
accept the proposition that newsmen are entitled to at least a qualified First Amendment
privilege." Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D. Va. 1976).
82. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
83. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
84. 441 U.S. at 170. In his dissent, Justice Brennan proposed a qualified editorial privi-
lege for journalists, allowing discovery into a journalist's editorial thought process only after
a prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood was made. Id. at 197-98 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
85. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968).
86. 441 U.S. at 170. During oral argument, Chief Justice Burger asked, "How do you
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
Some lower courts have used the Supreme Court's rejection of an
editorial privilege in public figure defamation suits as grounds for re-
jecting a reporter's privilege to refuse discovery of confidential sources.
In DeRoburt v. Gannett Co. ,87 for example, the president of a small
Pacific island republic sued Gannett Company for an allegedly libelous
article reporting that he had violated standards of international diplo-
macy by loaning money to a separatist movement in another country.
Ordering disclosure of the confidential sources who provided the infor-
mation, the Hawaii District Court cited Herbert as authority for its
statement that a privilege must yield if it erects "an impenetrable bar-
rier to the plaintiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case."
'88
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ordered disclosure
of the source of a story that suggested that a chief of police had lied
about the circumstances under which he had sustained a gunshot
wound. 89 The court emphasized the evidentiary burdens a privilege
places on a public figure plaintiff and interpreted Herbert as indicating
that "to meet the New York Times standard, any press privilege must
give way before the First Amendment." 90 The court granted the mo-
tion compelling disclosure of the source and ruled that continued re-
fusal to disclose would give rise to a presumption that there was no
source.91 In effect, this presumption satisfies the New York Times stan-
dard for the plaintiff because it amounts to a showing that the defend-
ant was reckless for publishing without a source.
92
These applications of the Herbert case are questionable in light of
the majority's conclusion that the denial of an editorial privilege would
probe for the presence or absence of malice if you can't ask what was the state of mind at the
time this or that was done?" It was a practical question that persuaded a six vote majority to
reject the editorial privilege claim. See Oakes, Proof ofActual Malice in Defamation Actions:
An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 655, 655 (1979). For a general discussion of
Herbert v. Lando, see Ashdown, Editorial Privilege and Freedom of the Press: Herbert v.
Lando in Perspective, 51 U. CoLo. L. Rnv. 303 (1980); Franklin, Relections on Herbert v.
Lando, 31 STAN. L. Rnv. 1035 (1979); Friedenthal, Herbert v. Lando: A Note on Discovery,
31 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1979); Note, Herbert v. Lando: The Supreme Court's Infldelitl to New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 13 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 374 (1980). Justice Brennan has criticized
the press for overreacting to the Herbert decision. See Justice Brennan, Dedicatory Address
for the S.L Newhouse Center for Law and Justice (October 17, 1979), reprinted in 32
RUTGERS L. Rnv. 173, 179 (1979).
87. 507 F. Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii 1981).
88. Id. at 883 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 170).
89. Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (1980).
90. Id. at 386-87, 415 A.2d at 686; see also Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley News-
papers, Inc., 101 Idaho 795, 800-01, 623 P.2d 103, 108-09 (1980) (citing Herbert as authority
for refusal to recognize first amendment privilege against disclosure).
91. 120 N.H. at 387, 415 A.2d at 686.
92. One journalist has expressed fear that this method of enforcing court orders to dis-
close could facilitate harassment suits by plaintiffs wishing to silence critics. Letter from
Fred Graham (July 28, 1981) (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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not have an inhibiting effect on the press.93 Because of the difference
between an editorial privilege and a privilege to protect news sources,
the application of Herbert to cases involving source disclosure may be
strained. Denial of an editorial privilege is less likely to foreclose chan-
nels of information than is disclosure of confidential sources because
source disclosure can directly hinder the publication of news by dimin-
ishing the safety of confidential relationships between reporters and
their sources. Although the lack of an editorial privilege may inhibit
the publication of information already in the news organization's pos-
session, the risk of source disclosure may affect the availability of infor-
mation by limiting the flow of information from sources to reporters.
94
In a recent case,95 the Fifth Circuit distinguished the editorial priv-
ilege denied to journalists in Herbert from the privilege to withhold a
source's identity. It reasoned that the denial of a privilege to protect
sources would be more likely to have a chilling effect on the publication
of news.
96
Hence, the two Supreme Court cases most closely related to the
problem of source disclosure do not resolve the problem. Herbert con-
cerns defamation discovery, but is limited to the claim of editorial priv-
ilege, which the Court assumes will not inhibit the publication of news.
Moreover, the denial of an editorial privilege is less likely to compro-
mise the constitutional rights of another party, such as a confidential
source in a vulnerable position. Branzburg, on the other hand, focuses
on grand jury proceedings, which have interests and constitutional im-
plications that are largely foreign to testimonial conflicts in civil cases.
Garland v. Torre
Because of the limited range of Supreme Court precedent, courts
seek guidance elsewhere when deciding whether to compel the disclo-
sure of a source. Generally, courts have relied upon Garland v. Torre,97
a Second Circuit case decided in 1958. In Garland, actress Judy Gar-
land sued the Columbia Broadcasting System because an unnamed
network executive had allegedly called her "overweight." Garland
sought the identity of the source from Marie Torre, the reporter who
wrote the article quoting the executive, but Torre refused to reveal her
source. Although the district court ordered disclosure of the inform-
93. "Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the suppression not only
of information known or strongly suspected to be unreliable but also of truthful information,
the issue would be quite different." 441 U.S. 153, 172 (1979).
94. See notes 54-56 & accompanying text supra; see also Note, Source Protection in
Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 338, 361-62 (1981).
95. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981).
96. Id. at 725. For a discussion of Miller, see notes 121-29 & accompanying text infra.
97. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
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ant's identity, Torre still refused to reveal the source and was held in
criminal contempt. The Second Circuit affirmed the contempt finding,
concluding that the identity of the confidential source was necessary to
Garland's case and that the interest in preserving the court's power to
compel testimony from witnesses outweighed Torre's claim of constitu-
tional privilege. 98
A three-part test has evolved from Garland. Disclosure of the
source is required if. (1) the information is relevant to the plaintiff's
claim; (2) the information cannot be obtained by alternative means;
and (3) the information requested goes "to the heart of the plaintiff's
claim." 99 Most courts continue to apply the Garland standards in defa-
mation actions involving problems of confidential source reliability.'00
Several considerations, however, weaken the basis for continued adher-
ence to the Garland standards.
First, it is unclear whether Garland established a qualified privi-
lege for journalists to withhold source identities. Several courts have
explicitly interpreted Garland as a rejection of any reporter's privi-
lege, 10 while others have interpreted it to be a clear recognition of a
qualified privilege. 10 2 Whether a court recognizes or rejects a qualified
privilege is important because the recognition of a qualified privilege
requires the party seeking disclosure to prove that the necessity of dis-
closure outweighs the first amendment interest in protecting the confi-
dential source. 0 3 A plaintiff's bare assertions that disclosure of the
98. Id. at 549-50.
99. Id. at 549-51; see also Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualffed
Privilegefor Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 737-38 (1975).
100. See Mize v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D. Tex. 1979); see also
Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualfed Privilegefor Newsmen, 26 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 709, 743 (1975).
101. See, eg., Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 930 (1977); Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 330 N.E.2d 847
(1973).
102. See, eg., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (no com-
pulsory disclosure in course of "fishing expedition"); Senear v. Daily Journal American, 27
Wash. App. 454, 618 P.2d 536 (1980) (privilege on non-disclosure of confidential news
source in civil case); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978) (limited privilege subordinated by compelling state interest).
103. In recognizing such a qualified privilege, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia noted recently: "In general, when striking the balance between the civil litigant's
interest in compelled disclosure and the public interest in protecting a newspaper's confiden-
tial sources, we will be mindful of the preferred position of the First Amendment and the
importance of a vigorous press. Efforts will be taken to minimize impingement upon the
reporter's ability to gather news. Thus in the ordinary case the civil litigant's interest in
disclosure should yield to the journalist's privilege. Indeed, if the privilege does not prevail
in all but the most exceptional cases, its value will be substantially diminished. Unless po-
tential sources are confident that compelled disclosure is unlikely, they will be reluctant to
disclose any confidential information to reporters." Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
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source is needed to prove his or her case would be insufficient to over-
come the first amendment presumption against disclosure. °4
Second, the standards of the three-part test are applied inconsis-
tently. Some courts have interpreted the requirement that other means
of obtaining the information be exhausted, while other courts have
compelled disclosure without requiring the plaintiff to exhaust other
means of obtaining the information. 10 5 In Carey v. Hume, 10 6 for exam-
ple, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered a re-
porter to reveal the source of an allegedly libelous column. The article
claimed that the plaintiff, a United Mine Workers official, had stolen
records from the office of the UMW president to keep them from gov-
ernment investigators. Although the reporter admitted that the source
was a UMW employee, he would not name the source. The court, fol-
lowing the Garland tests, ordered disclosure although the plaintiff
might have obtained the information by deposing UMW employees,
reasoning that deposition proceedings in search of relevant information
would be too burdensome.10 7 Thus, under Carey, the point at which
the alternative means test will be satisfied remains uncertain.
08
Third, the importance of the first amendment interest in Garland
104. Compare Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va., 1976)
(recognition of first amendment privilege to refuse disclosure absent a showing that refusal
to disclose blocks practical access to information crucial to the moving party's case) with
Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973) (complete rejec-
tion of any first amendment privilege to refuse disclosure of confidential sources).
105. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631,638-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S.
938 (1974) (alternative means of obtaining the information too burdensome); Adams v. As-
sociated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439, 441 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 901 (1971) (no
attempt to obtain the information through alternative means).
106. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
107. Id. at 638-39. Eventually, Hume's source, a UMW employee with family ties to the
senior Union Counsel, came foward voluntarily under informal court assurances that har-
assment of her would not be tolerated. The case went to trial in 1975, and the verdict went
to the defendants. Letter from Brit Hume (July 21, 1981) (copy on file with the Hastings Law
Journal).
108. Perhaps part of the confusion stems from the Garland opinion's lack of clear lan-
guage concerning alternative discovery measures. It does not specify the degree to which
alternative discovery measures must be "exhausted" before ordering disclosure. "While it is
possible that the plaintiff could have learned the identity of the informant by further discov-
ery proceedings directed to CBS, her reasonable efforts in that direction had met with singu-
lar lack of success." Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 551 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958). Several courts and commentators have interpreted the standard to be one of "ex-
haustion." See, e.g., Mize v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Zerilli
v. Bell, 458 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D.C. 1978); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Sup.
Ct. Iowa), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); see also Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the
Developing Qualo'ed Privilegefor Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 742 (1975). Other courts
have given the standard a less restrictive definition. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977) (whether the party seeking information has inde-
pendently attempted to obtain the information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful); Carey
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was understated. Garland was decided six years before the Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan fundamentally changed the law of libel
by bringing defamatory statements within the ambit of constitutional
protection. Although it has been asserted that Garland has continued
vitality despite the fact that it was decided before New York Times,10 9
the opinion has been criticized as antiquated." 0 When Garland was
decided, the public interest in compelling testimony to aid the powers
of the court system was weighed against the reporter's private relation-
ship with his or her source."' Since New York Times, however, this
interest has shifted from a private relationship between reporter and
source to a public interest in the. flow of news." 2
In effect, the first amendment interest in Garland was narrowly de-
fined, discounting its constitutional value by labelling it a reporter's
individual exercise of first amendment rights rather than a public inter-
est in the free dissemination of information. Standing against a public
v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 638 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974) (litigant cannot
be made to carry wide-ranging and onerous discovery burdens).
In granting a stay of a contempt citation issued against a reporter who refused to dis-
close the identities of his confidential informants before the Massachusetts Commission on
Judicial Conduct, Justice Brennan noted the importance of seeking the information from
other sources. "Assuming that there is at least a limited First Amendment right to resist
intrusion into newsgatherers' confidences, this case presents an apt occasion for its invoca-
tion.... [R]espondent judge could have obtained the information sought from the appli-
cant by other adequate---albeit somewhat roundabout-methods. Thus, this case does not
present a question of necessity for the confidences subpoenaed. What is ranged against the
asserted First Amendment interests of the applicant is essentially respondent's convenience."
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1316 (1980).
109. See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S.
938 (1974).
110. "The balancing process in Garland was based upon a common law premise that the
interest of the reporter in protecting a source is aprivate one, which must yield to the supe-
rior public interest in the administration of justice. That premise was refuted by New York
Times." (emphasis in original). Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 302, 562
P.2d 791, 805 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977) (Donaldson, J., dissenting).
1 11. "Without question, the exaction of this duty to testify impinges sometimes, if not
always, upon the First Amendment freedoms of the witness. Material sacrifice and the inva-
sion of personal privacy are implicit in its performance. The freedom to choose whether to
speak or be silent disappears." Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir.), cer. denied,
358 U.S. 910 (1958).
112. See Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, 805-06 (1977),
cer. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977) (Donaldson, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, who wrote the
opinion in Garland, later retreated from Garland's underlying principle that freedom of the
press "must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair
administration of justice." 259 F.2d at 549. Fourteen years later, in his Branzburg dissent,
Justice Stewart wrote: "In striking the proper balance between the public interest in the
efficient administration of justice and the First Amendment guarantee of the fullest flow of
information, we must begin with the basic proposition that because of their 'delicate and
vulnerable' nature, . . .and their transcendent importance for the just functioning of our
society, First Amendment rights require special safeguards." 408 U.S. at 738 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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interest in the integrity of the judicial process, the reporter's privilege
was easily dismissed. 1 3 If the first amendment interest is redefined as
part of the "national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open,"'"l 4 the constitu-
tional value of maintaining the confidentiality of sources increases, cre-
ating the likelihood that the interest in uninhibited news flow will
receive greater weight in the balancing process.
Underlying the Garland court's emphasis on judicial integrity was
the desire to preserve judicial power to compel relevant testimony.
This interest in judicial power diminished the force of the reporter's
first amendment claim for a privilege to protect confidential sources." 15
The interest in administrative integrity has been asserted in more re-
cent disclosure cases." 6 Hence, a defamation plaintiff, seeking to com-
pel disclosure of a journalist's source of information, may not only
claim an interest in obtaining evidence to prove his or her case, but
may also assert the general necessity of disclosure as part of a judicial
obligation to seek the truth through the disclosure of all relevant
evidence.
The administrative integrity of the judicial process, however, is not
a goal in itself. Its primary importance is derived from its relationship
to the legal objectives of conflict resolution and redress of injury. In
the absence of ultimate conflict or injury, administrative machinery
lacks its underlying purpose.
The Supreme Court has provided some authority for the rejection
of administrative interests as a legitimate basis for the restriction of first
amendment rights. In Watkins v. United States,"7 a witness sum-
moned before a congressional subcommittee on unamerican activities
refused to answer questions about the possible communist associations
of people he knew, and consequently was convicted of a misdemeanor
for his refusal. Finding no valid legislative purpose for such inquiries,
the Supreme Court overturned the conviction and concluded that com-
pelled testimony could not be justified even though congressional in-
vestigatory authority was broad and essential to the legislative
process.""
113. "But '[tihe personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the
individual to the welfare of the public.'" Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d at 549 (quoting Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)).
114. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
115. 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1958).
116. See Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. Iowa), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
905 (1978); Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, 805, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 930 (1977); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847
(1973).
117. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
118. Id. at 187.
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We cannot simply assume. . . that every congressional investigation
is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights af-
fected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by
the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does
not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor
abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 19
Lacking a legislative purpose, the congressional subcommittee's
investigation had no legitimate basis for compelling the witness to an-
swer questions about the political affiliations of others. In a defama-
tion action in which compulsory disclosure of news sources is sought, a
court balancing the competing interests of the parties should be aware
of the constitutional values at stake. Asserting that disclosure is neces-
sary to vindicate the procedural powers of the court says little about the
underlying purpose of the procedure or the importance of competing
values.
Towards Greater First Amendment Protection
Because of the limitations of prior case law governing source dis-
closure, several courts have devised their own solutions to the prob-
lem. 120 A few recent cases demonstrate the potential for a more
thoughtful approach to the constitutional dimensions of the contro-
versy and show the greater willingness of courts to accept new ideas for
the administration of a qualified privilege for reporters to protect their
confidential sources.
Miller v. Transamerican Press'21 was the first federal appellate case
to address the problem of confidential source disclosure in a defama-
tion action since the Supreme Court's decision in Herbert v. Lando.122
In 1972, Overdrive magazine, owned by Transamerican Press, pub-
lished approximately 59,000 copies of an issue containing an article
about a series of loans made from a regional pension fund of the Team-
sters Union. A paragraph in the article suggested that one of the fund's
trustees had embezzled money from the fund through a fraudulent
loan. Six months later, the trustee filed a libel action against Trans-
american Press in federal district court. After several unsuccessful at-
tempts to force disclosure of the informant's identity, the plaintiff
convinced the court in 1977 to order disclosure of the source.123 Con-
tinued noncompliance by the defendant led to an interlocutory appeal
119. Id. at 198-99.
120. See, eg., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.
1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1041 (1981); Senear v. Daily Journal American, 27 Wash. App. 454, 618 P.2d 536 (1980).
121. 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980).
122. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
123. 621 F.2d at 723.
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to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court in 1980.124
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Miller from Herbert by finding
that the arguments in favor of a privilege to protect sources were more
persuasive than those in favor of a privilege to protect the editorial
process, because source disclosure was more likely to inhibit the publi-
cation of news. 125 The court ruled in favor of disclosure based on Gar-
land v. Torre,1 26 concluding that its three-part test was satisfied.,2 7 The
Fifth Circuit underscored the significance of Miller three months later,
however, when it supplemented its opinion by adding a requirement
that the plaintiff show "substantial evidence that the challenged state-
ment was published and is both factually untrue and defamatory"
before disclosure can be ordered. 28 In denying a rehearing, the court
concluded from the record that this requirement, along with the Gar-
land test, was satisfied.' 29 The addition of this test, which requires sub-
stantial evidence of basic elements of the plaintiffs cause of action for
defamation before disclosure is ordered, indicates judicial dissatisfac-
tion with the Garland standards.
Miller is one of several recent cases requiring a stronger showing
of necessity by the plaintiff than is required under Garland before dis-
closure can be ordered. 30 These cases represent judicial efforts to
adopt a less mechanical approach to the first amendment conflict be-
tween a plaintiff's evidentiary requirements and the demands of the
first amendment. As these cases imply, the problem with the Garland
standards is that they fail to provide sufficient protection for the first
124. Id. at 727.
125. Id. at 725.
126. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
127. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d at 726-27.
128. 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir.
1980); Senear v. Daily Journal American, 27 Wash. App. 454, 618 P.2d 536 (1980). Al-
though Bruno was a private individual libel action, and thus did not require that the New
York Times knowing and reckless falsity standard be met as a basis for liability, the court
emphasized that the use ofjudicial formulas may inadequately consider the first amendment
interests against disclosure of news sources. 633 F.2d at 598. "We deliberately refrain from
further categorizing with any precision what inquiries should be made by the court or in
what sequence. . . . While obviously the discretion of the trial judge has wide scope, it is a
discretion informed by an awareness of First Amendment values and the precedential effect
which decision in any one case would be likely to have. Given the sensitivity of inquiry in
this delicate area, detailed findings of fact and explanation of the decision would be appro-
priate." Id. In Senear, an appeals court required that a libel plaintiff convince the trial
court that there is "independent merit" to the basic elements of the libel action, and that "the
First Amendment interests of the news media are outweighed by the rights and interests of
the litigant" before disclosure can be ordered. Both tests were in addition to the Garland
standards. 27 Wash. App. at 473, 618 P.2d at 546; see also Cervantes v. Time, 464 F.2d 986,
992-93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1972) (rejecting necessity for disclosure upon
showing that media defendant thoroughly checked its story before publication).
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amendment values at stake. The primary focus of the Garland stan-
dards is relevance, an uncertain veil of protection against frivolous or
abusive attempts by plaintiffs seeking to discover the identities of confi-
dential sources. Moreover, the tests are susceptible to arbitrary balanc-
ing by courts, which may use the Garland formula to justify a
preformed conclusion.' 3'
Modifying the Standards
Under the Garland standards, a plaintiff must show that the iden-
tity of the confidential source is relevant to a critical part of the case,
and that the information sought is unavailable through other means.
The Garland standards, however, balance the constitutional interests
against an interest that is defined strictly in terms of a plaintiff's cause
of action. The Garland formula does not require that a defamation
plaintiff demonstrate an underlying necessity for disclosure, a necessity
that goes beyond the mechanics of a cause of action because it repre-
sents a competing interest that genuinely deserves compensation or
protection. 32 Only by requiring more stringent tests before compelling
disclosure will the first amendment interests be adequately protected.
In addition to the Garland standards, a plaintiff should provide sub-
stantial evidence of actual injury and of the likelihood of success on the
merits of his or her claim before disclosure is ordered.
33
131. Professor Emerson suggests that the balancing test is easily manipulated to reach a
judge's preconceived decision. "[Clourts in fact seldom apply the balancing test in a serious
way. Even the leading experts on balancing, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, have been
unable to demonstrate convincingly that the balancing technique actually considers and
evaluates all the relevant factors. In the hands of most judges, the balancing test comes to be
nothing more than a way of rationalizing preformed conclusions." T. EMERSON, THE SYS-
TEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 718 (1970).
132. The third prong of the Garland test requires that disclosure of the informant's iden-
tity go "to the heart of the plaintiffs claim." 259 F.2d at 550. Courts, however, have tai-
lored the test to the mechanics of a defamation cause of action and have examined its
applicability within that limited framework. In Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974), the court found that the source's identity went to the
heart of the plaintiffs claim as evidence intended to show recklessness under the New York
Times rule. 492 F.2d at 637. In Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981), the court found the third test of the" Garland standards
satisfied, ruling that the plaintiff had a compelling interest in the information sought because
it was the only way he could prove reckless falsity. 621 F.2d at 726-27.
133. The adoption of balancing test factors, however, assumes that a balancing test is
appropriate under the circumstances. The Supreme Court has held that first amendment
freedoms can only be regulated when the state presents a countervailing interest that is
"compelling." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). However, courts in source dis-
closure cases generally have not employed the compelling state interest test, which would
require strict scrutiny of a state interest impinging on constitutionally protected rights. But
e Zerilli v. Bell, 458 F. Supp. 26 (D.C. 1978) (rejecting plaintiffs interest in bringing suit
under the Privacy Act as insufficiently compelling to justify disclosure of news sources).
There may be precedent for an intermediate test, falling between the compelling state inter-
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Actual Injury
One standard capable of offering more concrete protection to first
amendment interests in source disclosure cases is the requirement that
the plaintiff provide substantial evidence of actual injury or harm
before disclosure is compelled.
The Supreme Court has held that speculative or hypothetical harm
to an interest competing with a first amendment interest is an insuffi-
cient basis for an action that impairs first amendment rights. In Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,'34 the Supreme
Court held that a school district could not suspend high school students
for wearing armbands in class to protest the Viet Nam war without a
showing that such conduct interfered with classroom discipline. The
Court recognized that the symbolic protest created some hostility
outside the classroom, but declined to uphold the school district's ac-
tion in the absence of proof that the silent protests actually disrupted
the classroom and interfered with the operation of the school. 135 "[Imn
our system," wrote Justice Fortas for the majority, "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression."' 36 Thus, while the Court recognized
an interest in preserving order in the classroom, the schools suspension
of the protesting students unconstitutionally impaired their free speech
rights because their suspension was ordered without proof that the in-
terest to be protected had been actually harmed or injured.
The Court's reasoning in Tinker suggests that mere assertions of
injury may not provide a sufficient basis for restricting the vitality of
first amendment rights. In defamation actions, allowing a plaintiff the
right to force disclosure of confidential sources in an effort to defend
his or her reputation may compel disclosure of a source's identity when
est test and the balancing test. In equal protection cases, the Supreme Court has tradition-
ally required that state laws creating suspect classifications, such as race, be subjected to
strict scrutiny under a compelling state interest test. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). In cases involving classifications based on sex, however, the Court has devel-
oped an intermediate standard of review, requiring that the classification must "serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In disclosure cases before legislative
investigative bodies, the Court has required that "the State convincingly show a substantial
relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state
interest." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1962).
While the standards of Craig and Gibson are similar, the Court has not articulated an inter-
mediate standard of review for first amendment cases. The adoption of a more stringent
balancing test, however, could, as a practical matter, substantially upgrade the protection of
constitutional interests. Hence, an inquiry into the underlying interests in source disclosure
could be the functional equivalent of some intermediate standard.
134. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
135. Id. at 514.
136. Id.
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there has been little or no injury to the plaintiff's reputation. Because
injury to the plaintiff is the basis of a cause of action for defamation,
37
the absence of evidence of actual injury should create a presumption
against judicial orders that may restrict a first amendment interest.
Without substantial evidence that the plaintiff suffered actual harm, the
underlying purpose of the lawsuit, compensating an injured plaintiff, is
illusory. 38 Consequently, in addition to the three-part test of Garland,
a defamation plaintiff should be required to provide substantial evi-
dence of actual harm as a prerequisite to disclosure of confidential
sources.
In defamation actions, however, actual injury has been broadly
defined. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,139 the Supreme Court restricted
the power ofjuries in private individual libel actions to award damages
in excess of the amount necessary to compensate plaintiffs for actual
injury absent a finding that the media defendant published with know-
ing or reckless disregard for the truth. 40 The Court stated, however,
that actual injury includes "impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffer-
ing." 41 Thus, the definition of actual injury is expansive, encompass-
ing a wide variety of harms that a defamation plaintiff could claim to
have suffered.
Because this broad definition may diminish the significance of an
actual injury test, careful scrutiny of actual injury evidence should be
required, and actual injury should not be presumed at the outset of a
discovery process in which first amendment rights may be vulnerable to
unnecessary intrusions. Although the Supreme Court's definition of
actual injury appears to be reasonable, the evidence produced to
demonstrate the quality and magnitude of the injury sustained must be
137. "The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of
individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
138. In a different context, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a reporter's contempt
conviction, holding that disclosure of the source, from whom the reporter had obtained the
contents of a grand jury presentment, would unnecessarily infringe upon first amendment
interests in the absence of proof that publication of the information actually injured an
individual. The newspaper story reported the grand jury's criticism of the Dade City Police
Chief before he could take action to repress the grand jury report under Florida law, which
allowed unindicted persons to file a motion to repress presentments critical of them. With-
out proof that the Police Chief would have succeeded in repressing the report, the Court
concluded that the speculative injury to his reputation was insufficient to justify the disclo-
sure order. "If the mere possibility of injury to private reputation justified a court in requir-
ing that a reporter divulge sources, in what circumstances would a reporter not have to give
up the names of confidential informants?" Morgan v. State, 337 So.2d 951, 956 (Sup. Ct.
Fla. 1976).
139. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
140. Id. at 348-49.
141. Id. at 350.
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subjected to close examination to ensure that the harm suffered is
neither imagined nor unreasonable. Furthermore, actual injury evi-
dence should be studied with the recognition that public figures are not
necessarily injured significantly by the publication of defamatory state-
ments about them. Such individuals generally have greater access to
public communication channels, affording them some recourse to deny
or explain a statement they consider defamatory.
42
Substantial Evidence of Success on the Merits
In addition to meeting the Garland standards and the actual injury
test, a plaintiff should be required to show substantial evidence of suc-
cess on the merits for those issues that are capable of proof without
disclosure of confidential sources. Thus, the public figure plaintiff
should provide substantial evidence of publication, falsity, defamatory
content, and reference to the plaintiff before disclosure will be consid-
ered.' 43 Requiring the plaintiff to offer substantial evidence on these
elements before compelling disclosure would decrease the likelihood
that disclosure would be ordered in cases that would have been rejected
for failure to prove another essential element of the case. In addition, a
plaintiff whose main objective is source disclosure would find it more
difficult to force disclosure by simply filing a defamation action. 44
In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,145 the
Supreme Court held that procedures of an investigation that threaten
first amendment rights must be substantially related to an "overriding
and compelling state interest."' 46 Thus, the Court found that a legisla-
tive committee investigating communist infiltration exceeded its consti-
tutional limitations when it ordered an NAACP official to produce a
142. The Supreme Court made this observation in Gertz. See id. at 344. This concept
was recently reaffirmed in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that public figures "usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access than private individuals to channels of effective communication, which
enable them through discussion to counter criticism and expose the falsehood and fallacies
of defamatory statements." Id. at 164. See also Arkin & Granquist, The Presumption of
General Damages in the Law of Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1482, 1493 (1968).
"The small hate publications from both ends of the political spectrum constantly deride
political leaders. Attacks against them, defamatory or not, are printed daily in more reputa-
ble publications. Amidst this incessant debate, often on a low plane, it is difficult to believe
that a public official's reputation is inevitably going to be injured by publication of a libel
particularly since a public official has good opportunity for rejoinder."
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A and Comments (1977) (discussion
of the elements a plaintiff must prove in a public figure defamation action).
144. See note 9 supra. As noted, the Fifth Circuit expanded the three-part test of Gar-
land in Miller v. Transamerican Press, 628 F.2d 932, supplementing Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), by adding a test requiring the plaintiff to show
substantial evidence of success on the merits of the case before disclosure can be ordered.
145. 372 U.S. 539 (1962).
146. Id. at 546.
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list of the organization's Miami membership. Because no relationship
was shown to exist between NAACP activities and communist infiltra-
tion, the Court concluded that the committee's production order was
not substantially related to a compelling state interest and that it consti-
tuted an unjustified infringement of the first amendment rights of
NAACP members, who might be deterred from free speech and associ-
ation if they knew they could be identified as NAACP activists. 147
The existence of a "substantial relationship" between procedures
that threaten first amendment rights and a compelling state interest is
not easily proven. The Gibson Court required that there be "an ade-
quate foundation for inquiry" before forcing disclosures that may in-
hibit the exercise of first amendment rights.148 Similarly, there should
be an adequate foundation for inquiry before ordering disclosure of
news sources in defamation actions, because disclosure of sources may
inhibit the exercise of first amendment rights. If a defamation plaintiff
cannot present substantial evidence of the basic elements of a defama-
tion cause of action, the foundation for inquiry has not been estab-
lished. One commentator has suggested that the Gibson approach can
"prevent or reduce the likelihood of mass fishing expeditions" in con-
gressional investigations. 149 Similarly, the Gibson approach could
eliminate frivolous defamation claims and avoid an order of disclosure
of confidential sources when a prima facie case of defamation cannot
be established. 150
147. Id. at 555-57. "lit is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation
which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association
and petition that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the information
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest." Id. at 546.
148. Id. at 557. The Gibson Court's primary rationale was that any state policy that
threatens to inhibit the type of free communication protected by the first amendment must
be justified by a compelling state interest. See note 147 & accompanying text supra. Al-
though Gibson was decided in the context of legislative investigations, its general principle
appears to have a broader applicability. Justice Goldberg's opinion drew significantly from
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), another disclosure case in which a Little Rock,
Arkansas ordinance requiring membership disclosure of any organization operating within
the city was found unconstitutional. Bates discussed state interests in disclosure generally,
not solely in the context of a particular type of state investigation. By relying on Bates as
authority for Gibson, Justice Goldberg suggested a general proposition that disclosure orders
that threaten first amendment rights must be substantially related to a compelling state inter-
est. In the context of disclosure orders in defamation proceedings, an unsubstantiated defa-
mation claim should not qualify as a compelling state interest that outweighs the important
first amendment interest in an uninhibited news flow.
149. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 276 (1970).
150. Reference to the plaintiff may be one area of frequent dispute. In one libel action,
for example, disclosure of the source of the information was ordered before reference to the
plaintiff could be established. The allegedly libelous report had stated that the son of a high
city official had been arrested for smoking marijuana. The Mayor and his son won an order
compelling disclosure before the issue of reference was even addressed. Adams v. Associ-
ated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969) cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 901 (1971). The
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Conclusion
The conflict between public figure plaintiffs and journalists over
the protection of confidential news sources has been addressed in a va-
riety of judicial approaches. Despite the Supreme Court's recent re-
jection of an editorial privilege in Herbert v. Lando, several courts seem
to be leaning towards a more constitutionally-sensitive approach to the
confidential source problem, an approach that examines the purposes
and not merely the mechanics of a balancing test. The adoption of
strict standards emphasizing the underlying values in a defamation ac-
tion can offer a stronger shield for a vigorous press, while allowing an
injured plaintiff to recover compensation for defamatory statements.
Although the Garland standards afford some protection for the first
amendment values of the reporter-source relationship in defamation
actions, the addition of an actual injury standard and the requirement
of substantial evidence of success on the merits of the case could pro-
vide more substantive protection for the first amendment interests in
nondisclosure. Few tests, however, are immune from judicial manipu-
lation. Thus, the tests or standards employed should ensure that judi-
cial formulas do not casually compromise the basic values that the
constitution is designed to promote as well as protect.
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